This paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a twostage (R&D stage and marketing stage) alliance with a marketer and an innovator. The marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator. We find the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer.
Introduction
In many R&D intensive industries it has become increasingly popular for firms to form strategic R&D alliances to innovate and commercialize new products. A recent study shows that there were more than 600 biotech-pharmaceutical alliances formed in 2007 alone, and their value has increased from $30 billion to more than $90 billion between (Global Business Insights, 2008 . Royalty contracts are commonly used to structure and govern biotechpharmaceutical R&D alliances and are frequently revised (Mason et al. 2008) . Royalty contracts are often revised in R&D alliances because of several distinct features of such alliances. First, an R&D alliance normally has well-defined stages or milestones which provide natural opportunities for firms to review information and renegotiate deals. Second, firms could take the lead alternatively in different stages of the alliance. In a bio-pharma alliance, the biotech firm normally takes the lead in the R&D stage while the pharmaceutical firm takes the lead in the marketing stage. Hence, the firms need to revise the initial royalty contract as their roles are changing across stages to dynamically align incentives in the alliance. Third, interacting with each other in the early stage(s) of the alliance, some of the firms' privately endowed information could be revealed through their actions. Learning the other firm's private information, the firm who has stronger influence on setting contract terms in the alliance could propose to revise the 1 Royalty contract revisions are also widely practiced in other industries. For example, to speed the transfer of its superconductor wire technology in the market, American Superconductor Corp, a leading global supplier of superconductor products, and Pirelli Energy Cables and Systems, the world's largest power cable manufacturer, renegotiated terms in their initial strategic alliance agreement in 2002 to increase the royalty rate American Superconductor pays to Pirelli for any wire sold.
original contract to a more favorable one for itself.
Although royalty contract revision is widely practiced, little is known about how it impacts the incentives and performances in an R&D alliance, how different alliances should revise their royalty contracts differently, and what types of alliances would benefit the most from royalty contract revision. This paper aims to answer these questions in a stylized model of multi-stage R&D alliance, where an innovator (he) and a marketer (she) form an R&D alliance to jointly develop and market a new product in two sequential stages: the R&D stage and the marketing stage.
The marketer and the innovator could have asymmetric information regarding the innovator's R&D capability. Before the R&D stage begins, the marketer offers a menu of royalty contracts that may or may not be contingent on the technical performance of the product that emerges from the R&D stage and asks the innovator to pick one from the menu. Each royalty contract in the menu consists of a fixed transfer and a royalty rate that will be paid to the innovator on each dollar of the revenue generated from the product. After the R&D stage, the marketer can propose to revise the initial royalty contract, while the innovator can either accept or reject the marketer's contract revision proposal. With this model, we establish the following main findings.
First, we characterize the optimal truth-telling inducing initial menu of royalty contracts and royalty revision strategy for the marketer. With royalty revision, the marketer not only needs to consider which contract an innovator would choose from the initial menu, but also needs to consider how the innovator would react to (reject or accept) her royalty revision proposal later. To induce the innovator to choose the initial contract and react to the revision proposal truthfully, the marketer has to distort the optimal initial royalty contracts for both the more capable (high-type) and the less capable (low-type) innovators. This is in sharp contrast to a well-known existing result that distortion only occurs at the low-type's contract. Furthermore, we show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage, the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later. Otherwise, she should do the opposite.
Second, starting with royalty contracts that are not contingent on the technical performance of the product from the R&D stage, we identify two major effects of royalty revision on the expected profit of the marketer. Royalty revision provides the marketer with the flexibility of using different royalty rates in different stages to dynamically align incentives as the alliance progresses. This incentive re-aligning effect of royalty revision is beneficial and leads to a higher profit for the marketer. However, with royalty revision, the innovator is less willing to reveal his private information to the marketer because he knows the marketer would utilize this information to revise the contract later to a more favorable one for herself. This information revealing effect of royalty revision makes inducing truth-telling more costly for the marketer, in turn hurting her profit. With this dissection of the effects of royalty revision we are able to predict in what types of R&D alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision.
Third, with royalty contracts that are not contingent on the technical performance of the product from the R&D stage, we are able to pinpoint interesting interplays between contingent contract structure and the two major effects of royalty revision. When the innovator does not play a significant role in the marketing stage, the flexible contingent contract structure fully captures the incentive re-aligning effect of royalty revision. In this case, a contingent contract is perfectly substitutable to royalty revision. On the contrary, when the innovator does play a significant role in the marketing stage, the contingent contract structure cannot capture the incentive re-aligning effect of royalty revision, but helps weaken the information revealing effect of royalty revision by providing more flexibility for the marketer to differentiate innovators with different types. As a result, a contingent contract enhances the value of royalty revision and is therefore complementary to royalty revision. Thus, depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage, managers may need to use contingent contract (if possible) either to replace or with royalty revision to improve profits.
We review related literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model. Sections 4 and 5 study non-contingent royalty contracts and contingent royalty contracts, respectively. Several extensions of the model are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Our paper closely relates to the literature on innovation and licensing. Kamien and Tauman (1986) show that the optimal licensing strategy for an innovator with a cost-reduction invention is to license its invention by a fixed-fee contract. Gallini and Wright (1990) show that royalty can serve as a signaling device in an innovation licensing relationship with asymmetric information. Erat et al. (2007) consider a model where competitive end-product manufacturers license a technology from one upstream technology provider with symmetric information. They find that a mix of fixed fee and royalty may be optimal if the technology provider decides to license to a large number of end-product manufacturers. Crama et al. (2008) consider a risk-averse biotech innovator designs and offers a menu of three-part contracts (up-front, milestone, and royalty payments) to a risk-neutral pharmaceutical firm whose effort influences the project's final payoff.
While Crama et al. focus on how the innovator's risk aversion and the pharmaceutical firm's valuation determine the optimal contract structure (i.e., whether to include milestone payments or royalties) without renegotiation, we study the impact of renegotiation on royalty contracts with or without milestone payments. Savva and Scholtes (2009) study a multi-stage partnership between a biotech and a pharmaceutical firm. The firms have asymmetric information regarding the quality of the biotech's project. In a signaling model, they find that using royalties can cause inefficient termination of the project, and a joint venture arrangement restores the efficiency. We complement this line of literature by considering the potential for royalty contract revision and its impact in an R&D alliance with both adverse selection and moral hazard.
Our paper also relates to R&D and new product development literature (see Ulrich 2001, Krishnan and Loch 2005 , and Loch and Kavadias 2007 for excellent reviews). In this literature, there is a small group of papers that study incentives in decentralized R&D and product development within or between firms (See Anderson et al. 2007 about off-shoring R&D, and Bhaskaran and Krishnan 2009 for collaborative R&D). Sommer and Loch (2003) consider incomplete incentive contracts for R&D projects with ambiguity. They construct an incomplete contract for an ambiguity neutral principal to re-instate optimal incentives for an ambiguity averse agent. Terwiesch and Loch (2005) present a model where a firm designs and produces a customized product to customers through a multi-stage collaborative prototyping process.
They show how the firm can price the prototypes and the final product to signal its design capability to customers. Chao et al. (2009) study how funding authority and incentives affect a central manager's allocation of resources between existing product improvement and new product development, which are managed independently by two decision makers. They find that a socalled variable funding drives higher efforts, but induces the manager to focus more on existing product improvement than new product development. Mihm (2009) considers an internal costgaming issue in a new product development project and shows how incentive schemes, such as profit-sharing contracts and component-level target costing, can provide incentives for engineers to improve cost compliance of the project. All these papers study static incentive problems without the possibility of contract revision, which is the focus of our paper. Taylor (2007a, 2007b ) study the impact of contract renegotiation in an R&D setting where a manufacturer writes capacity supply contracts with pharmaceutical companies. However, their focus is on renegotiation over capacity allocation, whereas ours is on renegotiation over royalties.
The economics literature on renegotiation is vast (see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005 for a review) and can be classified into two streams: renegotiation under adverse selection (e.g., Hart and Tirole 1988, Laffont and , and renegotiation under moral hazard (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1990). In the former, the agent's type is unknown to the principal; renegotiation opportunity arises in the late period because the principal may learn the agent's private type from his contract choice made in the early period. In the latter, the risk-averse agent exerts effort that is unobservable to the principal; renegotiation opportunity arises after the agent making his effort decision but before uncertainty being resolved. Both streams of literature find that renegotiation improves ex-post efficiency but may negatively impact ex-ante incentives. Our paper is distinct from both streams of economics literature on renegotiation in that we study the impact of renegotiation under both adverse selection and moral hazard.
Model
An innovator (e.g., a biotech company) and a marketer (e.g., a pharmaceutical company) form a strategic R&D alliance to jointly explore, develop and market a new idea conceived by the innovator. Both the innovator and the marketer are risk neutral with reservation profit of zero.
The alliance takes place in two sequential stages: the R&D stage followed by the marketing stage.
In the R&D stage, the innovator and the marketer collaborate in R&D to explore the idea to see if it can be successfully developed into a product. The innovator will exert R&D effort  1 to conduct required R&D for the alliance, and the marketer will also contribute to the R&D by exerting R&D effort  1 . Both R&D efforts  1 and  1 are private actions that are not contractible. The R&D efforts are costly to the two parties. The cost of exerting R&D effort  1 is  2 1 2  for the innovator, while the cost of exerting R&D effort  1 is  2 1 2 for the marketer. The coefficient   can be understood as a measure of the capability of the innovator in executing the R&D of the idea (see Che and Gale 2003 for a similar R&D model). To exert the same effort, it is cheaper to exert the effort for an innovator with a higher   (more capable) than for an innovator with a lower   (less capable). The innovator knows exactly the value of his R&D cost coefficient   or his capability. However, the marketer does not know the exact value of   .
To facilitate tractability, we assume that she only knows that   can take one of two values   and   with 0       with the following probability distribution:
with probability    , with probability 1 − 

We call an innovator with   an -type innovator. Hence, the innovator and the marketer have asymmetric information regarding the innovator's R&D cost coefficient   or R&D capability. Our model with both moral hazard and information asymmetry captures the most essential natures of R&D alliances, especially bio-pharma alliances, as shown by empirical studies in Finance and Entrepreneurship (e.g., Kaplan and Stromberg 2004, Lerner 2000) .
With probability  ∈ (0 1], the idea could turn out to be a technical success (e.g., obtaining FDA approval) at the end of the R&D stage. The probability of technical success  captures the technical uncertainty faced by the alliance. Upon success, the technical performance of the product emerged from the R&D stage,  is a random variable with a support on [0 ∞) (i.e., once proven successful, the technical performance of the product would be nonnegative).  could represent how many and which indications are approved by the FDA or what restrictions (e.g., warning label) the FDA would impose on the product. The mean of  is determined jointly by the innovator's R&D effort  1 and the marketer's R&D effort  1 as: 2
The realized technical performance  is observable to both parties. With probability 1 − , the idea could turn out to be a technical failure (e.g., rejected by FDA due to severe side effects) at the end of the R&D stage. In this case, the idea cannot be developed into a marketable product.
Consequently, the alliance will be terminated and both parties will receive no future payoffs.
If the outcome of the R&D stage is a technical success, the alliance advances to the marketing stage in which the product will be commercialized in the market. The total revenue from marketing the product  is driven by four factors. First, the realized technical performance of the product emerged from the R&D stage  determines the revenue potential of the product -the higher  is the higher the revenue will be for the product. Second, the marketer's marketing effort  2 will lead to a deterministic increase in the revenue for the product. Such marketing effort corresponds to advertising, promotions, deploying salesforces and utilizing existing distribution channels. The cost of the marketing effort  2 to the marketer is  2 2 2. Third, the innovator would continue to exert additional R&D effort  2 to further enhance the technical performance of the product. Such further enhancements could make the product appealing to more consumer segments in the market, in turn increasing the sales of the product. For example, after obtaining FDA approval on a new drug, a biotech firm can keep investing additional R&D effort to develop an over-the-counter version of the drug and/or to develop variations of the drug to target more indications. It also costs the innovator  2 2 2  to exert the additional R&D effort  2 . Finally, market demand for a new product is usually uncertain. The total revenue for the product is influenced by a random noise  with mean 0.  captures the market uncertainty faced by the alliance, which is independent of the technical uncertainty in the R&D stage. 3
Given the realized technical performance of the product , the innovator's technical supporting effort  2 , and the marketer's marketing effort  2 , the total revenue collected from selling the product is determined by the following additive form:
where  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0. The coefficients  and  measure the effectiveness of the innovator's additional R&D effort and the marketer's marketing effort in enhancing the revenue of the product respectively. For a product with a high value of , the innovator has a great potential in extending the success of the product in the market with additional follow-up R&D effort.
Hence, the innovator would play a significant role in improving the sales of the product in the marketing stage of the alliance. For such a product, after the basic R&D in the first stage, there could be plenty of opportunities to develop variations of the product (e.g., a children's version, an over-the-counter version) to target broader market segments after the initial discovery. In contrast, for a product with a low value of , after the initial R&D there is not much room for follow-up R&D by the innovator to enhance the technical performance of the product, thereby increasing revenue. It is mainly up to the marketer's power to promote the product in the market to generate higher sales. An example of such a product could be a drug that targets a single indication or condition (e.g., PEG-Interferon lambda for Hepatitis C). After the initial discovery of the drug, the potential for additional follow-up R&D to extend the drug to other indications or market segments is limited. In such a case, the success of the drug in the market now critically hinges on the marketing ability of the marketer. When  is large, it implies that the marketer is very capable and effective in marketing the product. Such a product could be a blockbuster drug for which large pharmaceutical firms' sales organizations are normally designed to market. When  is small, it represents that the marketer is less efficient in marketing the product or the marketer's marketing effort has insignificant impact on the drug sales (e.g., a
niche drug that targets a rare indication with small market size such as Ligand's ONTAK).
3 The model can easily incorporate potential reduction in market uncertainty between the R&D stage and the marketing stage (see Bhattacharya et al. 1998) . For example, we can consider that in addition to , the two parties also observe a signal about the market uncertainty . Such a signal contains information about , thereby reducing the market uncertainty. All of our qualitative results hold with such an extension. If R&D outcome is a success, the innovator receives contingent payment (if used)
The marketing stage takes place, and royalty is paid to the innovator according to the final agreed royalty rate
The marketer proposes to revise the original royalty rate. The innovator accepts or rejects the proposal Figure 1 : The sequence of events in the alliance.
The marketer takes the lead to design and offer contracts to the innovator. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1 . We consider royalty contracts that are not contingent on the technical performance  as well as royalty contracts that are contingent on . Because of her imperfect information on   , the marketer offers a menu of royalty contracts and asks the innovator to pick one contract from it to report his type. We focus on separating contracts that induce truth-telling from the innovator. However, we want to point out that separating contracts may not perform better than semi-separating and pooling contracts. Analyzing semiseparating and pooling contracts and comparing them with separating contracts would be an interesting future research. The fixed payment will be made according to the contract chosen by the innovator. Then, the innovator exerts R&D effort  1 , while the marketer also exerts her R&D effort  1 . If the R&D outcome is a failure, the alliance would be terminated. Otherwise, the technical performance  is realized payment would be made if the contract is contingent on . After observing , the marketer could update her belief about the innovator's type and can propose to revise the royalty contract chosen by the innovator. The innovator can either reject the marketer's royalty contract revising proposal to stick to the initial royalty contract or accept the marketer's royalty contract revising proposal to switch to a new royalty contract.
The innovator's right to reject the marketer's contract revision proposal prevents hold-up from happening in our model. The marketing stage starts and the innovator exerts additional R&D effort  2 while the marketer exerts marketing effort  2 . The total revenue of the product  is realized and royalty is paid to the innovator according to the final royalty contract agreed.
Royalty Contracts Not Contingent on 
We start with royalty contracts that are not contingent on the technical performance  at the end of the R&D stage. We will call this type of royalty contract "non-contingent royalty contract."
The marketer offers a menu of royalty contracts {     },  ∈ { } to the innovator and asks him to choose one contract from the menu. Under a royalty contract in the menu, the fixed transfer   will be made before R&D takes place and the innovator is promised to receive a royalty payment of    at the end of the marketing stage. Thus, the payments under this type of royalty contract are not contingent on  directly. The marketer may use a non-contingent royalty contract for reasons such as it is too costly or tedious to verify and contract on , or  is simply not verifiable and contractible in some cases. We focus on separating contracts that induce truth-telling from the innovator, and our objective is to characterize the optimal menu of royalty contracts that maximizes the marketer's expected profit.
The marketer and innovator are engaged in a multi-stage game with incomplete information.
Thus, our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see pages 331-333 in Fudenberg
and Tirole 1991 for the definition and requirements for this equilibrium concept). Let  1 () be the marketer's belief of the innovator's type in the R&D stage after observing that the innovator has chosen the contract (     ). Because we focus on separating contracts that induce truth-telling,  1 () =  for  = { }, i.e., the marketer's belief should be consistent with the innovator's equilibrium contract choice. Given that contract (     ) was chosen before the R&D stage, let  2 ( ) be the marketer's belief of the innovator's type after observing the realized technical performance . The perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that beliefs must satisfy Bayes' rule, suggesting that  2 ( ) =  for  = { } and any  ≥ 0. It is unnecessary to specify the marketer's belief of the innovator's type after observing the innovator's response to (i.e., accepting or rejecting) the contract revision because that belief has no impact on the subsequent effort decisions. This belief structure satisfies consistency check on any off-equilibrium path because the information set ( ) is always on the equilibrium path for  = { } and  ≥ 0, that is, any  ≥ 0 is possible under the equilibrium effort decisions for both types in the R&D stage.
Revision of the Initial Royalty Contract
Suppose that the innovator chose the contract (     ) from the initial contract menu and the realized technical performance is  conditional on a technical success at the end of the R&D stage. Observing the innovator's contract choice  and the realized , the marketer forms the belief of the innovator's type  2 ( ) = , and then proposes to revise the royalty rate to   with a fixed transfer   . The innovator can either accept or reject the proposal.
Consider the case where the innovator rejects the marketer's contract revision proposal and sticks to his initial contract choice (     ). Then, the innovator will decide his additional R&D effort  2 to maximize his expected profit, while the marketer simultaneously decides her marketing effort  2 to maximize her own expected profit. With efforts  2 and  2 , the innovator's expected profit at the end of the marketing stage (excluding the fixed transfer   and the sunk cost of his
which is maximized at  2 =     . The marketer's expected profit (excluding the fixed transfer   and the sunk cost of her R&D effort
2 2 which is maximized at  2 = (1 −   ) . Hence, substituting  2 and  2 , by rejecting the revision proposal, the innovator's expected profit in the marketing stage would be (Let  denote the innovator's expected profit, and the subscript "" to represent that the innovator rejects the revised contract):
Now, we consider the case when the innovator accepts the marketer's revised royalty rate   .
Then, the innovator's expected profit at the end of the marketing stage would be
Hence, when the innovator accepts the revised royalty rate, his expected profit would be (Let the subscript "" represent that the innovator accepts the revised contract):
while the marketer's expected profit (denoted by Π) in the second stage based on her belief is:
Therefore, if the marketer wants the innovator to accept the proposed new contract, she has to make sure that the innovator would do no worse under the new contract than under the initial contract. In other words, the proposed new contract must be Pareto improving. The marketer's contract revision problem for the type  innovator can be written as 4 :
The following Proposition characterizes the optimal contract revision strategy for the marketer.
Proposition 1. Assume the innovator chose the contract (     ) from the initial contract menu, and the realized technical performance of the product conditional on a technical success is  at the end of the R&D stage. It is optimal for the marketer to revise the royalty rate   in the initial contract to:
in exchange for a fixed transfer:
It is worth noting that  *  in (7) is increasing in   , which implies  *  ≥  *  , i.e., the high-type will get a higher royalty rate than the low-type. The optimal revised royalty rate  *  is forwardlooking and does not depend on the realized technical performance of the product . It reflects the main reason for the marketer to revise the initial contract: After the innovator's R&D effort  1 is sunk and  is realized after the R&D stage, there is a need to re-align the innovator's incentive in the marketing stage by revising the initial royalty rate. Specifically,  *  is increasing in the coefficient  but decreasing in the coefficient . As we discussed above, with a high value of , the innovator will play a significant role in the marketing stage by exerting additional R&D effort  2 . Therefore, it is important to motivate the innovator to exert higher effort  2 with a higher royalty rate. In contrast, in an extreme case where  = 0, (i.e., the innovator would not contribute at all in the marketing stage), we have  *  = 0: there is no need to motivate him to work hard anymore so that the royalty rate should be revised to 0. Essentially, the marketer would offer a fixed payment  *  () to ask the innovator to opt out of the alliance. As discussed before, such a product could be a drug targeting a single condition with large market size. For such a product (e.g., PEG-Interferon lambda for Hepatitis C with which an estimated 170 million people worldwide are infected), the big pharma (e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb) normally would allow the small biotech (e.g., ZymoGenetics) to opt out. On the contrary, when  is high the marketer contributes to the marketing stage more and would rely less on the innovator's contribution.
So, the marketer would reduce the royalty rate for the innovator. Another interesting extreme case is  = 0, i.e., the marketer cannot contribute to the marketing stage at all, where we have  *  = 1: the marketer should opt out of the alliance in exchange for a fixed payment. Such a product could be a niche drug targeting a rare condition (e.g., Ligand's ONTAK for cutaneous lymphoma) for which the big pharma's (e.g., Lilly's) marketing effort has insignificant impact on its sales.
Unlike the royalty rate  *  , the fixed transfer  *  () in the revised contract depends on both the initial contract (     ) chosen by the innovator and the realized technical performance  as well as the coefficients  and . The main purpose of the fixed payment  *  () is to make sure that the innovator would accept the revised contract. The initial contract (     ) and  determine the innovator's status quo before the marketing stage, and thus his willingness to accept the revised contract. Although both parties anticipate the initial royalty rate   will be revised in the future anyway, the initial contract still can motivate the innovator to exert higher R&D effort  1 in order to gain a preferable status quo before facing royalty revision.
The Initial Menu of Royalty Contracts
The marketer offers a menu of royalty contracts {     }, where  = { } under which a type  innovator would voluntarily pick the contract (     ) from the menu to truthfully reveal his type, . When the innovator does so, he will anticipate that a Pareto improving contract specified in Proposition 1 will be proposed by the marketer after the R&D stage. To figure out how the marketer can induce truth-telling from the innovator, let's consider the innovator's incentive to deviate from the contract that is designed for his type.
Assume the type  innovator purposely chooses the contract (     ), where  6 = , to hide his type  from the marketer. By doing so, he knows that after the R&D stage, if the outcome is a success, he would receive a proposal from the marketer to revise the royalty rate   to  *  in exchange for a fixed transfer  *  (). 5 He will have two options at that time: rejecting the contract revision proposal or accepting it. If he rejects the proposal and sticks to the initial contract (     ) he picked, the type  innovator's expected profit when he chooses the contract (     ) at the beginning of the R&D stage would be
In this case the marketer would exert R&D effort  * 1 = (1 −   )  and marketing effort  * 2 = (1 −   )  (note that after the innovator rejecting the revision, the marketer may update her belief about the innovator's type. However, it will not impact the marketer's marketing effort decision). Now, consider the case that the innovator accepts the contract revision proposal after the R&D stage. Given the technical performance  after a technical success, the innovator's expected profit 5 When the type  pretends to be a type  innovator by choosing the contract (     ), the marketer's revision strategy is based on her belief about the innovator's type, which is  2 ( ) = .
in the second stage (excluding the sunk effort cost associated with  1 and the fixed transfer )
Note that the marketer would exert marketing effort  * 2 = ³ 1 −  * ´ . Substituting  * 2 and  * 2 , the innovator's expected profit at the beginning of the R&D stage is
which is the type  innovator's expected profit when he truthfully reveals his type by choosing contract (     ), and then accepts the marketer's Pareto improving proposal to revise the initial contract to ( *    *  ()) as specified in Proposition 1. In this case, plugging in the corresponding optimal efforts  * 1 ,  * 2 , and  * 2 , and recalling that  *  () is a linear function of , the marketer's expected profit when the type  innovator truthfully reveals his type is given as
Therefore, the marketer's initial contract design problem, denoted by (P1), can be written as
Unlike the traditional adverse selection problem in which each type has only one incentive compatibility constraint, there are two incentive compatibility constraints for each type of innovator in our problem with contract revision. In our model, not only is the marketer concerned that one type of innovator could mimic the other, but she is also concerned how that innovator would react to (i.e., accept or reject) the future contract revision proposal. For the high-type, constraint IC−r (IC−a) ensures that truth-telling is better than mimicking the low-type and then rejecting (accepting) the contract revision proposal intended for the low-type in the future.
These two IC constraints together with the individual rationality constraint (IR) guarantee that the high-type will voluntarily choose contract (     ) to truthfully reveal his type. Similarly, for the low-type, the two corresponding IC constraints (IC−r) and (IC−a) together with the IR constraint (IR) ensure truth-telling. A key observation in solving the traditional adverse selection problem is that the low-type's incentive compatibility constraint will not bind in the optimal solution, and thus can be ignored to simplify the problem (see Chapter 2 in Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) . In other words, it is not necessary for the contract designer to worry about the possibility that the low-type mimics the high-type. Unfortunately, this observation does not hold in our model. In problem (P1) above, both incentive compatibility constraints for the low-type (IC−r) and (IC−a) could bind at the optimal solution.
We first define several useful notations:
The following proposition characterizes the optimal initial menu of royalty contracts which the marketer should offer to the innovator before the R&D stage starts.
Proposition 2. Given the marketer's Pareto improving contract revision strategy { *    *  ()} for  ∈ { } specified in Proposition 1, (i) the optimal initial menu of royalty contracts that are not contingent on , { *    *  } for  ∈ { } offered by the marketer is characterized as Case Conditions Binding constraints Optimal initial royalty rates,
and the optimal initial fixed payment  *  is set accordingly to ensure the constraints specified in the second column in the above table and the constraint (IR) binding; (ii) If the innovator and the marketer have symmetric information (i.e.,   =   = ), the optimal initial royalty contract { *   * } offered by the marketer is
and the optimal initial fixed payment  * is set to ensure the innovator's IR constraint binding.
Because the innovator anticipates the contract revision after the R&D stage, the optimal revised royalty rates,  *  and  *  are critical in determining the innovator's incentives, thereby optimal initial menu of royalty contracts. 6 Five mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases can 6 Because,  *  is monotone in  and  (see Proposition 1), the discussions below on how  *  and  *  influence the arise. In case 1,  *  is very small ( * 2  ≤  2 ), which implies that  *  is even smaller (recall that  *  ≥  *  ). If the high-type mimics the low-type by choosing contract { *    *  } in the initial menu, he would reject the contract revision proposal with the even smaller royalty rate  *  in the future. As a result, constraint IC−r is binding while constraint IC−a is not. Interestingly, for the low-type, if he mimics the high-type by choosing contract { *    *  } in the initial menu, he would actually accept the contract revision proposal with the very small royalty rate  * 2  ≤  2 in the future. Thus, while constraint IC−r is not binding, constraint IC−a is, which is in sharp contrast to the traditional adverse selection problem in which the low-type's IC constraint would never bind. With one more binding constraint IC−a, the optimal initial royalty rate for the high-type (low-type) is distorted higher (lower) from the corresponding solution for the high-type (low-type) in the traditional adverse selection problem (i.e.,  *  ≥  1 and  *  ≤  3 ) in order to enlarge the gap between  *  and  *  to induce truth-telling.
In case 2,  *  becomes higher (satisfying  * 2    2 ), while  *  is still small ( *  ≤  3 ). Constraint IC−r is still binding because the high-type will reject the still small  *  in the contract revision. However, constraint IC−a becomes non-binding now because the low-type now is not willing to accept the higher  *  in the contract revision. So, the problem in case 2 is similar to the traditional adverse selection problem in which only the high-type's IC constraint is binding. Therefore, the optimal initial contract menu in case 2 resembles the solution in a traditional adverse selection problem ( *  =  1 and  *  =  3 ).
When the revised royalty rates  *  and  *  keep going higher, we have cases 3, 4, and 5. The intuition for cases 4 and 5 parallels the one for cases 1 and 2. The only difference is that in cases 4 and 5 both  *  and  *  are high so that if the high-type mimics the low-type, he would keep pretending to be a low-type by accepting the revised royalty rate  *  . Therefore, in cases 4 and 5, constraint IC−a is always binding while constraint IC−r is not. Case 3 is an interesting case in which the low-type's royalty rate will not be revised (i.e.,  *  =  *  ) in the model. In this case, both IC−a and IC−r are binding. Since the low-type's IC constraints are not binding, as in cases 2 and 4, the solution of case 3 is similar to the one of a traditional adverse selection
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 derives a special case where the innovator and the marketer have symmetric information regarding the innovator's capability. 7 With symmetric information, it is initial contract menu can be easily mapped to how  and  would influence the initial contract menu. 7 The special case can be derived from part (i) straightforwardly by using   =   = . There are other equivalent ways of obtaining this special case such as setting  = 0 or  = 1. The analysis and results will be identical.
not necessary to offer a menu of contracts, and a single contract would be enough. Hence, the five cases in part (i) would simply reduce to a single case, because the mimicking incentives we discussed above would not exist. This special case will be useful for us to pinpoint the impact of royalty revision in later part of the paper.
In practice, an important decision for managers is whether to offer a low royalty rate initially and then renegotiate to revise the royalty rate up later or to do the opposite by offering a high royalty rate initially and then renegotiate to revise the royalty rate down later. The following proposition characterizes conditions under which the marketer should offer to revise up or down the initial royalty rate for the low-type and the high-type innovators.
´, the marketer should offer the low-type innovator a revising-up contract (i.e.,  *  ≥  *  ). Otherwise, the marketer should offer the lowtype innovator a revising-down contract (i.e.,  *    *  ); (ii) If  ≤ , the marketer should offer the high-type innovator a revising-up contract (i.e.,  *  ≥  *  ). Otherwise, the marketer should offer the high-type innovator a revising-down contract (i.e.,  *    *  ).
We only discuss intuitions for the revising-up case to which intuitions for revising-down case mirror. Note that the condition in part (i) is less restrictive than the one in part (ii), which implies that the low-type is more likely to receive a revising-up contract than the high-type.
As we discussed above, the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortion in the initial contracts: the high-type receives a higher royalty rate whereas the low-type receives a lower royalty rate than the corresponding ones under the traditional adverse selection model without royalty revision. Thus, after the adverse selection problem is resolved after the R&D stage, the marketer is more likely to revise the overly distorted royalty rates for the high-type down and for the low-type up correspondingly to restore the efficiency in the marketing stage.
The condition for revising-up for the high-type in part (ii) only depends on  and , whereas in addition to  and , the condition for revising-up for the low-type in part (i) also depends on ,  and   −   which determine how low the second best royalty rates would be distorted to. It is interesting that, all else equal, the condition in part (i) is more likely to hold when the technical success probability  is small. The innovator's R&D effort would create less expected value for the alliance when  is small. So, when distorting the low-type's royalty rate down, the marketer would be less concerned about hurting the innovator's incentive in exerting R&D effort.
This leads to a low initial royalty rate for the low-type which is likely to be revised up later.
The revising-up conditions for both types in Proposition 3 are more likely to hold when  is high and  is low. Because the innovator exerts efforts in both stages, with a high  or/and a low  (as discussed in the model section that this could represent a niche drug such as Ligand's ONTAK), the innovator potentially can contribute a great deal in generating revenue for the product in the marketing stage, whereas the marketer cannot. As a result, it is critical to motivate the innovator to do so in the marketing stage. Therefore, the marketer should anticipate to revise the initial royalty rate up after the R&D stage is completed (as Eli Lilly did to Ligand) to boost the incentive for the innovator to exert higher R&D effort  2 in the marketing stage. Everything else equal, the conditions for revising-up would always hold for a high enough  or/and a low enough . On the contrary, when  is low or  is high (this could represent a drug targeting a single condition with large market size such as Zymo's PEG-Interferon lambda), the opposite argument would be true, and the marketer should revise the initial royalty rate down for the innovator (as Bristol-Myers Squibb did to Zymo). In fact, in the extreme case of  = 0, the marketer would ask the innovator to opt out of the alliance in the marketing stage by reducing the royalty rate to 0.
The Impact of Royalty Contract Revision
We now examine the impact of royalty contract revision in detail. We use a benchmark case in which the marketer offers the innovator a menu of royalty contracts {b    b   }, where  = { }, and will not revise the royalty rates in the future.
A Benchmark: Royalty Contracts without Revision
In this benchmark case, the marketer still designs the contract menu {b    b   } such that a type  innovator would voluntarily pick the contract
from the menu to truthfully reveal his type . Assume the type  innovator tries to hide his type from the marketer by purposely choosing
, where  6 = . Because the contract chosen will not be revised in the future, the type  innovator's expected profit when he chooses the contract 
Without royalty revision, the marketer faces a traditional adverse selection problem in which each type only has one incentive compatibility constraint (i.e., IC and IC, respectively). Using standard solution technique, the optimal menu of royalty contracts
as the optimal royalty contract ¡ b  *  b  * ¢ under symmetric information are characterized in the appendix. Let b Π * denote the marketer's optimal expected profit under program (P2).
The Incentive Re-aligning Effect
We start with the special case in which the innovator and the marketer have symmetric information (i.e.,   =   = ). This special case allows us to identify one key effect of royalty revision in a crystal clear way.
Proposition 4. With symmetric information (  =   = ) under royalty contracts that are not contingent on , (i) the marketer's optimal expected profit with royalty revision, Π * is no less than her optimal expected profit without royalty revision, b Π *  i.e., Π * − b Π * ≥ 0; All else equal, there exists a threshold  ∈ [0 ∞) such that, (ii) for   , the marketer will offer revise-down contracts to the innovator (i.e.,  *   * ), and the benefit of royalty revision Π * − b Π * is strictly positive and decreasing in ; (iii) for   , the marketer will offer revise-up contracts to the innovator (i.e.,  *   * ), and the benefit of royalty revision Π * − b Π * is strictly positive and increasing in ; (iv) for  = , the marketer will not revise the contract (i.e.,  * =  * = b  * and  * () = 0), and the benefit of contract revision Π * − b Π * = 0
Part (i) of Proposition 4 indicates that without asymmetric information, the marketer will do no worse with royalty revision than without royalty revision. Mathematically speaking, the marketer has four contract parameters ( *   *   *   * ) with royalty revision rather than only two contract parameters (b  *  b  * ) without royalty revision, which gives her more flexibility with royalty revision. With more flexibility, it is not surprising that the marketer would do no worse with royalty revision. Proposition 4 also reveals one important benefit of royalty revision to the marketer which we call the incentive re-aligning effect. As parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition jointly indicate, the benefit of contract revision is stronger when the effectiveness coefficient of the innovator's R&D effort in the marketing stage,  takes extreme values (either very high or very low). The value of the effectiveness coefficient of the innovator's R&D effort in each of the two stages (1 in the R&D stage and  in the marketing stage) reflects the degree of importance of motivating the innovator to exert R&D effort in the stage. When  takes extreme values, it will be very different from its counterpart coefficient in the R&D stage (that is fixed at 1), which implies that very different royalty rates are needed at the two stages respectively to incentivize the innovator to exert effort. In other words, there is an imbalance between the two stages in terms of incentive provision for the innovator. Royalty revision provides a means for the marketer to respond to such an imbalance by offering two different royalty rates in the two stages to re-align the incentives in the alliance.
When  is very high (very low), the marketer has a far stronger (weaker) need to motivate the innovator to exert higher R&D effort in the marketing stage than in the R&D stage. As a result, the marketer would offer the innovator a higher (lower) royalty rate ( * ) before the marketing stage starts by revising the initial royalty rate  * up (down) to  * . In America. Soon after the launch of Xerese by Meda in U.S., both firms recognized that it will "require considerable marketing resources [from Meda] to achieve successful penetration of this important market" (Medivir 2011). This is corresponding to a low /high  case in our model in which the marketer's marketing effort is the key to increase the sales of the product. As a result, the two firms renegotiated their initial agreement in June 2011 to revise Medivir's royalty down to "single-digit" in exchange for a $45 million one time payment from Meda (Medivir, 2011). With lower royalty payable to Medivir, Meda would have stronger incentive in investing the "considerable marketing resources" for Xerese.
As part (iv) suggests, if there is no need to have two different royalty rates for the two stages, royalty contract revision obviously would not create any value. The similar observations can be made for the effectiveness coefficient of the marketer's marketing effort  2 , . To simplify exposition, we will not provide the details regarding  in the paper.
Corollary 1. With symmetric information (  =   = ) under royalty contracts that are not contingent on , if  = 1 and  = 1 royalty revision does not create value for the marketer, i.e.,
Corollary 1 indicates that when the two stages are perfectly balanced in terms of incentive provision for the innovator (i.e.,  = 1 and  = 1), the incentive re-aligning effect would be neutralized. Thus, royalty revision would create no value at all to the marketer. When a new factor is added to the model, the above result offers a convenient way of shutting off the incentive re-aligning effect so that we can see the pure effect of the newly added factor clearly. We now investigate what effect that asymmetric information would bring into the model.
The Information Revealing Effect
We have identified one positive effect of royalty revision under symmetric information, which enables us to pinpoint how information asymmetry would shape the impact of royalty revision.
Proposition 5. With asymmetric information on the innovator's cost (     ) under royalty contracts that are not contingent on , (i) if the two stages of the alliance are perfectly balanced, i.e.,  = 1 and  = 1, royalty revision leads to strictly lower expected profit for the marketer, i.e., Π * − b Π *  0, and Π * − b Π * is decreasing in   −   ; All else equal, (ii) there exists a threshold  ∈ (0 ∞) such that if   −    , royalty revision leads to strictly lower expected profit for the marketer, i.e., Π *  b Π * ; (iii) there exists a threshold e  such that when  ≤ e , the marketer earns higher expected profit with royalty revision than she does without royalty revision (i.e., Π *  b Π * ).
Part (i) of Proposition 5 says that keeping the two stages perfectly balanced and just making the information asymmetric, royalty revision would become harmful to the marketer. This allows us to clearly identify a potential harm of royalty revision, which we call the information revealing effect. With asymmetric information the innovator knows that if he truthfully reveals his type by choosing the contract intended for his type in the initial menu, the marketer will utilize this information in the future contract revision to reduce the innovator's surplus. In contrast, the innovator has no such a concern when royalty will not be revised in the future. As a result, the innovator would be less willing to truthfully reveal his type under royalty revision than without royalty revision. In other words, the possibility of royalty revision hardens the innovator's incentive compatibility in the initial stage, which is reflected by the one extra IC constraint for each type of innovator in model (P1) with royalty revision as compared to model (P2) without royalty revision. Mathematically, more constraints in model (P1) will lead to lower optimal objective function value (the marketer's optimal expected profit). Part (ii) of the above proposition shows that when the two types are different enough, the information revealing effect of the royalty revision will overweigh any potential benefit of the incentive re-aligning effect to hurt the marketer's profit.
Empirical research on R&D alliances has long recognized that information asymmetry is prevalent and causes various incentive problems in bio-pharma alliances (e.g., Lerner 2000, Kim 2011). Pisano (1990) finds that due to uncertainties involved in drug R&D processes, firms in a bio-pharma alliance usually recognize that "it is futile to lock-in the terms of trade at the outset and generally agree to renegotiate the contract as uncertainties are resolved." He argues that contract renegotiation in bio-pharma alliances, however, represents a hazardous proposition because one of the parties could put effort to renegotiate the contract on terms more favorable to itself. Such a concern on the potential of contract renegotiation hurts firms' valuations and incentives on forming alliances. Our result on the information revealing effect voices the similar concern on contract renegotiation as the one argued by Pisano (1990) .
With a positive effect (the incentive re-aligning effect) and a negative effect (the information revealing effect), whether royalty revision benefits the marketer or not and the magnitude of its benefit apparently depend on the relative strengths of these two effects. When the positive effect is strong and the negative effect is weak at the same time, royalty revision would most likely lead to higher expected profit for the marketer. According to part (iii) of the above proposition, this would happen when  takes a small value. Because  is the coefficient of  2 in the marketing stage, when  is very small the innovator will play a limited role in the marketing stage no matter what type he is. Consider the extreme case where  = 0 both the high-type and the low-type would play no role at all in the marketing stage ( * 2 = 0 regardless of  * 2 ). Therefore, knowing whether the innovator is a high-type or a low-type is useless to the marketer. As a result, the innovator would not worry that the marketer will utilize the information about his type revealed in the first stage, which eliminates the information revealing effect.
Interestingly, when  takes a large value, royalty revision may not necessarily benefit the marketer. This is because although a large  does lead to a stronger incentive re-aligning effect, it unfortunately leads to a stronger information revealing effect as well. When  is large, the innovator would play an important role in the marketing stage and the marketer would motivate the innovator to exert higher effort. In this case, the difference between the two types of innovator's capabilities would lead to a difference between their efforts  * 2  which results in a difference between their contributions  * 2 to the revenue in the marketing stage. So, knowing whether it is a high-type or a low-type innovator involved in the marketing stage is very useful for the marketer. Therefore, the innovator would worry about revealing his type in the first stage, which strengthens the information revealing effect.
When an R&D alliance has the right characteristics to benefit from royalty revision, managers should clearly establish the expectation of royalty revision in the alliance, for example, by stating the possibility and process of royalty revision in the initial contract up front (as in the BristolMyers Squibb and ZymoGenetics alliance). However, when an R&D alliance does not benefit from royalty revision, managers should resist the short-term gain of royalty revision to commit not to revise the initial contracts, because ex-post contract revision hurts the overall profit in the long run when alliances opportunities with similar characteristics occur repeatedly over time. This especially can happen in alliances where parties can withhold or manipulate critical information.
In such cases, managers should clearly commit that contracts will not be changed in the future.
For example, they can make the process of contract revision extremely tedious and costly (e.g., requiring detailed reviews, authorizations and approvals from management at multiple levels), or establish well-defined project categories in which contract revisions were never performed.
Royalty Contracts Contingent on 
In this section, we consider royalty contracts that are contingent on the technical performance  at the end of the R&D stage. We will call this type of royalty contract "contingent royalty contract." Specifically, we consider that the marketer offers a menu of royalty contracts { 1   2    },  ∈ { } to the innovator. Under a royalty contract in this menu, the fixed transfer   will be made before R&D takes place. The innovator is promised to receive a payment of  1  at the end of the R&D stage if the R&D outcome is a success with a realized technical performance  and to receive a royalty payment of  2  at the end of the marketing stage. The payment of  1  that is contingent on  given a technical success can be understood as one form of milestone payment (note that a fixed milestone payment that is only contingent on the technical success is a special case) in the alliance. We still focus on separating contracts that induce the innovator with cost coefficient   to choose the contract ( 1   2    ) voluntarily to truthfully reveal his type, .
Given that the innovator has chosen the contract ( 1   2    ), let  1 () be the marketer's belief of the innovator's type after observing the innovator's contract choice in the R&D stage, and let  2 ( ) be the marketer's belief of the innovator's type after observing the realized technical performance . Similarly, perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that beliefs must satisfy Bayes' rule, suggesting that  2 ( ) =  1 () =  for  = { } and any  ≥ 0.
Revision of the Initial Royalty Contract
Suppose the innovator chose the contract ( 1   2    ) from the initial contract menu to truthfully reveal his type . If the R&D outcome is a success with a realized  at the end of the R&D stage, the payment of  1  will be made by the marketer to the innovator. Then, the marketer forms the belief on the innovator's type  2 ( ) =  and can propose to revise the royalty rate  2 to   with a fixed transfer   . At this point, the marketer's optimal royalty revision problem and the innovator's accept and reject decisions are the same as the ones under royalty contracts that are not contingent on  analyzed in section 4.1. Therefore, the marketer's optimal royalty revision strategy is similar to the one characterized in Proposition 1: If the innovator chose the contract ( 1   2    ) from the initial contract menu and the R&D outcome is a success with a realized , it is Pareto improving for the marketer to revise the royalty rate  2 in the initial contract to
The Initial Menu of Royalty Contracts
The marketer designs a menu of royalty contracts { 1   2    }, where  = { } such that a type  innovator would voluntarily pick the contract ( 1   2    ) in the menu to truthfully reveal his type, . The marketer's contract design problem can be formulated and analyzed in the similar process to the one presented in section 4.2. The detailed formulation and solution procedure, as well as the optimal contracts, are provided in the appendix. Let { * 1   * 2   *  } for  ∈ { } denote the optimal initial menu of royalty contracts and Π  * denote the marketer's optimal expected profit under the optimal royalty contracts that are contingent on . The following proposition characterizes interesting structures of the optimal initial menu of contingent royalty contracts and conditions under which the marketer should offer to revise up or down the initial royalty rate for the low-type and the high-type innovators.
Proposition 6. Under royalty contracts that are contingent on  (i) in the optimal initial menu { * 1   * 2   *  } for  ∈ { }, the marketer offers  * 1 = 0 and  * 2  0, for the high-type innovator and  * 1  0 and  * 2 = 0 for the low-type innovator; (ii) The marketer always offers the low-type innovator a revising-up contract (i.e.,  *    * 2 ); (iii) If  ≤ , the marketer would offer the high-type innovator a revising-up contract (i.e.,  *  ≥  * 2 ). Otherwise, the marketer would offer the high-type innovator a revising-down contract (i.e.,  *    * 2 ).
Surprisingly, according to part (i), even with the opportunity to write contingent contract based on , the marketer actually would not do so for the high-type innovator by setting  * 1 = 0 and would only rely on the royalty rate based on the final revenue  * 2  0 to motivate the innovator's effort in the R&D stage. However, the marketer would do exactly the opposite for the low-type innovator by offering him a contract that is purely contingent on  (i.e.,  * 1  0) with zero royalty rate  * 2 = 0 (which will be revised up to  *  later). With the possibility of offering royalty contracts contingent on , the marketer has one more flexibility in differentiating the two types of innovator by manipulating the additional contract parameter ( 1 ). Because both  1 and  2 can motivate the innovator's R&D effort, the marketer would fully take the advantage of this extra flexibility by using the two extreme structures of  1 and  2 to differentiate. Given the structures of the optimal initial menu, the low-type innovator would always receive a revising-up contract because  *    * 2 = 0. This is different from the case for the low-type under noncontingent royalty contract where she can possibly receive a revising-down contract as well (see part (i) in Proposition 3). For the high-type innovator, the condition for revising-up in part (iii) of the above proposition is exactly the same as the condition for revising-up in part (ii) of Proposition 3. Thus, the marketer's revising up/down strategy for the high-type innovator remains the same under contingent royalty contract.
The Impact of Royalty Contract Revision
In this section, we will examine the impact of royalty contract revision under royalty contracts that are contingent on . We still use a benchmark case in which the marketer offers the innovator a menu of royalty contracts that are contingent on , {b  1  b  2  b   } for  = { } before the R&D stage takes place, and will not revise the royalty rates in the future. Again, this benchmark case is a standard adverse selection problem that can be formulated and solved in similar procedures to the ones presented in section 4.3.1 for royalty contracts that are not contingent on . The optimal menu of royalty contracts
Let b Π  * denote the marketer's optimal expected profit in this benchmark case.
The Incentive Re-aligning Effect
Similarly, we start with the special cases where the innovator and the marketer have symmetric information (i.e.,   =   = ) to characterize the incentive re-aligning effect of royalty revision.
Proposition 7. With symmetric information (  =   = ) under royalty contacts that are contingent on , (i) if   , the marketer offers a royalty contract that is contingent on  (i.e., b  * 1  0 and b  * 2  0) and will not revise the contract in the future, and royalty revision creates no value for the marketer, i.e., the marketer will offer a royalty contract that is contingent on  and will not propose to revise this contract at the end of the R&D stage. In this case, the need of re-aligning the incentives between the two stages is fully satisfied by the flexible contingent contract structure (which also by nature has two different royalty rates b  * 1  0 and b  * 2  0) alone. In other words, contingent royalty contract is perfectly substitutable to royalty revision in this scenario, which makes royalty revision creating no extra value to the marketer. This is consistent with suggestions made by practitioners that various contingent clauses such as variable royalty rates, take-back clause can serve as alternatives to contract renegotiation to mitigate incentive misalignment problems in bio-pharma alliances (Mason et al. 2008 ). However, as part (ii) indicates, when  takes larger values, the marketer will not offer a contingent royalty contract even though there is an opportunity to do so. As discussed before when  takes larger values, the marketer should motivate the innovator to exert higher R&D effort in the marketing stage than in the R&D stage. Note that both b  * 1 and b  * 2 provide incentives for the innovator's R&D effort in the R&D stage  1 (through  and , respectively). If both b  * 1 and b  * 2 are positive, the marketer would provide too much incentive for the innovator's R&D effort  1 in the R&D stage. Hence, it is optimal for the marketer not to offer a royalty contract contingent on  by setting b  * 1 = 0, and rely solely on royalty revision to satisfy the need of re-aligning the incentives between the two stages.
The Information Revealing Effect
We now characterize the information revealing effect of royalty revision under contingent royalty contracts with asymmetric information.
Proposition 8. With asymmetric information regarding the innovator's cost (     ) under royalty contacts that are contingent on , (i) if the two stages of the alliance are perfectly balanced, i.e.,  = 1 and  = 1, then royalty revision leads to strictly lower expected profit for the marketer, i.e., Π  * − b Π  *  0, and
royalty revision leads to strictly lower expected profit for the marketer, i.e., Π  * − b Π  *  0; (iii) When  ≤ , the marketer earns lower expected profit with royalty revision than she does without royalty revision (i.e., Π  *  b Π  * ).
Parts (i) and (ii) of the above proposition are consistent with their counterparts in Proposition 5 with non-contingent contracts. Part (i) shows that keeping the two stages to be perfectly balanced, royalty revision under contingent contracts still hurts the marketer's expected profit, which clearly verifies that the robustness of the information revealing effect of royalty revision under contingent royalty contract. Part (ii) further verifies that how the strength of the information revealing effect of the royalty revision varies with the difference between the two innovator types is also robust to the contingent contract structure.
Part (iii) is in sharp contrast to its counterpart, part (iii) in Proposition 5 which shows that when  takes a small enough value, the marketer earns higher expected profit with royalty revision than she does without royalty revision (i.e., Π *  b Π * ) under non-contingent royalty contract. As we discussed after Proposition 5, smaller  would lead to stronger incentive realigning effect and weaker information revealing effect at the same time, which makes royalty revision more beneficial to the marketer under a non-contingent royalty contract. The first part of this statement on stronger incentive re-aligning effect would not be true anymore under contingent royalty contract. According to part (i) of Proposition 7, when  takes smaller values than , the incentive re-aligning effect of royalty revision would be fully captured by the flexible contingent contract structure. Therefore, when  takes smaller values than  under contingent royalty contract, the marketer earns lower expected profit with royalty revision than she does without royalty revision. The following result summarizes the impact of the opportunity of writing contingent royalty contracts on the value of royalty revision.
Proposition 9. With asymmetric information regarding the innovator's cost (     ), (i) when  ≤ , the marketer earns the highest expected profit by offering royalty contract that is contingent on  without royalty revision, i.e., b
writing royalty contract that is contingent on  weakens the information revealing effect of royalty revision, in turn enhances the value of royalty revision for the marketer, i.e.,
The marketer has four possible contracting strategies: contingent with or without revision (studied in this section), and non-contingent with or without revision (studied in the previous section). Part (i) says that when  takes smaller values (than ), the best choice for the marketer is to offer royalty contracts that are contingent on  without revision. All else equal, a contingent contract in general would do no worse than a non-contingent contract because of its flexibility.
Then, for  ≤ , recall that part (i) of Proposition 7 implies that a contingent contract structure and royalty revision are perfectly substitutable in terms of incentive re-aligning. Together with part (iii) of Proposition 8, it implies that royalty revision leads to a net loss for the marketer when  ≤ , and therefore should be avoided. This result indicates that if the innovator does not play a significant role in the marketing stage, the marketer should try to identify a verifiable outcome (such as ) of the R&D stage and simply associate the innovator's payoff to that outcome by offering a contingent contract to avoid the complications of contract revision.
Surprisingly, part (ii) of the above proposition tells a very different story between contingent contract and royalty revision. When   , on one hand, as indicated by part (ii) of Proposition 7, a contingent contract cannot capture the incentive re-aligning benefit of royalty revision due to concerns on over-incentivizing the innovator's R&D effort  1 . On the other hand, the more flexible contingent contract structure helps in weakening the negative information revealing effect of royalty revision because, as discussed after Proposition 6, the contingent contract structure itself provides more flexibility for the marketer to differentiate different types of innovator. As a result, using contingent contracts enhances the value of royalty revision. Thus, a contingent royalty contract is complementary to royalty revision. It implies that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage the marketer should try to use a contingent contract (if possible) and royalty revision jointly to improve her profit. This is consistent with findings in existing literature that performance contingent payments such as milestone payment (Kim 2011) and options (Noldeke and Schmidt 1995) can mitigate information asymmetry problems.
Extensions
The model we developed in this paper offers a convenient and flexible framework to incorporate more complex factors. In this section, we discuss several interesting extensions of the model.
Alliance Termination after Success
If the marketer incurs a continuation cost   0 in the marketing stage, the marketer could decide to terminate the alliance when  is not high enough for her expected profit from the marketing stage to recover . The possibility of alliance termination after success would make royalty contract revision more beneficial to the marketer. First, with alliance termination, the innovator is more likely to accept a revised royalty rate proposed by the marketer because he fears the possibility of termination if he rejects the proposal. Second, royalty revision could avoid inefficient termination. Without royalty revision, the alliance will be terminated as long as continuation with the initial royalty rate is not able to recover . However, it is possible that the innovator's expected profit is positive if the alliance can be continued. With royalty revision, the alliance could work out a new royalty rate to reallocate the potential gains from continuation so that both the innovator and the marketer could have positive payoffs instead of zeros under termination. A formal analysis of this extension is provided in Xiao and Xu (2011).
Risk Averse Innovator
With a risk averse innovator, royalty contract revision creates one more benefit to the marketer, which we call the risk re-allocation effect. After the R&D stage is completed, the technical risk or uncertainty would be resolved and the total risk to which the alliance is exposed is reduced.
Therefore, there is a need for the alliance to revise the initial royalty contract to reallocate the amount of risk that will be borne by each party in the marketing stage. Royalty revision provides a natural way for the marketer to offer two different royalty rates in the two stages respectively to allocate the risks. A formal model of the risk reallocation effect of royalty revision with a risk-averse innovator is provided in Xiao and Xu (2011).
Innovator Designs and Offers Contracts
It is possible that the innovator could take the lead to design and offer contracts to the marketer (see Crama et al. 2008 ). If we flip the roles of the innovator and the marketer as well as the information structure so the innovator offers contracts and the marketer has private information, our analysis and results would carry through from the perspective of the innovator. However, if we only flip the roles of the two parties but keep the information structure unchanged so the innovator offers contracts and has private information, the model would become a signaling model with contract revision. The solution process and the insight would be very different from the ones presented in this paper. This extension is certainly very interesting, but would deserve a separate paper.
Conclusion
In a strategic R&D alliance, firms often revise a pre-agreed royalty contract as the alliance progresses. This paper studies how and when to revise royalty contract in a multi-stage R&D alliance (an R&D stage followed by a marketing stage) consisting of an innovator and a marketer.
The marketer takes lead to offer royalty contracts to the innovator and could propose to revise the royalty contract chosen by the innovator after the R&D stage. With the potential for royalty revision, the marketer not only needs to ensure that the innovator chooses the right initial contract, but also needs to ensure that he accepts the revised royalty contract later. We show that this leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts. If the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage, the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then propose to revise the royalty rate up later. Otherwise, she should do the opposite by offering a high royalty rate initially and then propose to revise the royalty rate down later.
We characterize two fundamental effects of royalty revision in an R&D alliance: the incentive re-aligning effect and the information revealing effect. Royalty revision provides the marketer with an important flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates according to the innovator's contributions in different stages of the alliance to better align his incentives. This incentive realigning effect improves the marketer's expected profit from the alliance. However, royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator because the innovator worries the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable contract for herself later. This information revealing effect hurts the marketer's expected profit. Therefore, although royalty revision is ex-post Pareto improving for both parties in an alliance, it is a double-edged sword for the marketer. Whether royalty revision would benefit the marketer or not depends on the relative strength of these two effects. In an alliance where the innovator's contributions to the alliance are very imbalanced in the two stages so that two very different royalty rates are needed to align his incentives in the two stages accordingly, the incentive re-aligning effect would be strong and the marketer should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision in the alliance. In contrast, in an alliance where parties can withhold or manipulate critical information, the information revealing effect of royalty revision would be strong. In such a case, the marketer should resist the short-term gain of royalty revision and establish credible commitment that contracts will not be revised in the future (e.g., by making the renegotiation process tedious and costly, or by establishing project categories in which contract revisions were never performed).
It is Our results offer interesting, testable predictions/hypotheses, especially in the bio-pharma context. For example, the information revealing effect implies that royalty revision is more likely to be performed in alliances where partners have collaborated in the past so they know sufficient information about each other. The discussions of Proposition 3 suggest that royalty revise-up is more likely to happen in an alliance with a niche drug, while royalty revise-down is more likely to happen in an alliance with a blockbuster drug. With increasing availability of data on R&D alliances, especially bio-pharma alliances (e.g., Deloitte LLP publishes data on publicly announced alliances in biotech industry), it is possible to empirically test these predictions/hypotheses.
We have focused on separating contracts. Analyzing semi-separating and pooling contracts and comparing them with separating contracts would be an interesting future research. In a pooling contract, the marketer offers a single royalty contract initially. After observing  after the R&D 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Because the objective function of the marketer's contract revision problem decreases in   and the constraint is relaxed as   increases, the constraint must be binding at the optimal solution, i.e.,
Substituting   with the right hand side of the above equation, we can rewrite the objective function as a concave quadratic function of   , which is maximized at
This, together with (9), determines  *  (). ¥ Proof of Proposition 2. We first derive the closed form expressions for   ( ) and   ( ).
Recall that
where the second equality follows from that the marketer would exert R&D effort
Given the contract choice  and the technical performance  after a technical success, the type  innovator's expected profit in the second stage (excluding the sunk effort cost associated with  1 and the fixed transfer ) under the revised contract is
Note that the marketer would exert marketing effort  * 2 = ³ 1 −  * ´ . Consequently, the innovator's expected profit in the second stage is
where the first equality follows from the definition of  *  () in Proposition 1. Therefore,
where the second equality is due to
We make the following observations to simplify (P1). First, because
can be inferred by (IR) and (IC−a). Thus, (IR) can be ignored from (P1). Second, (IR) must be binding at the optimal solution, because otherwise decreasing   improves the objective value without violating any constraint. The binding (IR), together with (11) when  =  = , leads to
Third, either (IC−r) or (IC−a) must be binding at the optimal solution, because otherwise decreasing   improves the objective value without violating any constraint. It follows from (10) and (11) with  =  and  =  that
Therefore, (IC−r) is binding and (IC−a) is redundant if   ≥  *  ; otherwise (IC−a) is binding and (IC−r) is redundant.
According to the third observation, we decompose (P1) into two subproblems, by imposing
. This, together with (10) and (11), leads to
Substituting   and   with the right hand side of (12) and (13) into the objective function and the constraints of (P1), we have the first subproblem, denoted by (P1'), (P1') max
Similarly, by adding the new constraint   ≤  *  , we have the second subproblem, denoted by (P1"),
Let Π * 1 and Π * 2 be the optimal objective value of (P1') and (P1"), respectively. Then the optimal solution to (P1') ((P1")) is also optimal to the original problem if and only if Π * 1 ≥ Π * 2 (Π * 1 ≤ Π * 2 ). Next, we make two claims that characterize conditions under which Π * 1 ≥ Π * 2 and Π * 1 ≤ Π * 2 , respectively.
Proof of Claim 1. Note that   =  1 and   =  2 maximize the objective function of (P1").
Thus, if  *  ≤  2 , then the optimal solution to (P1") is   =  1 and   =  *  . This is also a feasible solution to (P1'), yielding the same objective value in both (P1') and (P1"). Hence,
Proof of Claim 2. Note that   =  1 and   =  3 maximize the objective function of (P1').
Thus, if  *  ≥  3 , then the optimal solution to (P1') is   =  1 and   =  *  . This is also a feasible solution to (P1"), yielding the same objective value in both (P1') and (P1"). Hence,
Finally, we are ready to characterize the optimal solution to (P1) in five mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1.  * 2  ≤  2 . In this case, because  2 ≤  2 3 and  *  ≤  *  , we have  *  ≤  3 . This also implies that  *  ≤  2 , which by Claim 1, suggests that the optimal solution to (P1') is also optimal to (P1). Thus, it suffices to solve (P1'). Note that the unconstrained optimal solution to (P1'),   =  1 and   =  3 , satisfies the first and third constraint of (P1'), but violates the second constraint, i.e., (IC−r). Hence, (IC−r) of (P1') must be binding at the optimal solution. Furthermore, (IC−a) of (P1') can be ignored. Thus (P1') can be simplified to
where   can be determined by   according to the binding (IC−r) constraint:
. This can be solved by a simple one-dimensional search over   . Thus, in this case,
In this case,  *  ≤  3 ≤  2 , which by Claim 1, suggests that it suffices to solve (P1'). Note that the solution,   =  1 and   =  3 , maximizes the objective function of (P1') and satisfy all the constraints of (P1'), and thus it is an optimal solution to (P1'). Thus, in this case,  *  =  1 and  *  =  3 .
Case 3.  3   *  ≤  2 . It follows from Claim 1 and 2 that Π * 1 = Π * 2 , and further the solution,   =  1 and   =  *  , is an optimal solution to (P1'). Thus, in this case,
Similarly, in Case 4 and 5, it suffices to solve (P1"). The rest of the proof is analogous to that of Case 1 and 2, and thus is omitted. ¥ Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i) follows directly from Proposition 2 where  *  ≥  *  if and only  *  ≥  3 which leads to the condition in part (i) after collecting terms. Next we prove Part (ii). If
, then the optimal solution falls into Case 2 to 5. In Case 2 to 4,
The Optimal Solution to (P2). We perform the following steps to simplify (P2). First, (IR) can be inferred by (IR) and (IC), and thus can be ignored. Second, (IR) must be binding at the optimal solution because otherwise decreasing b   improves the objective value without violating any constraint. Third, (IC) must be binding at the optimal solution because otherwise decreasing b   improves the objective value without violating any constraint. The binding (IR) and (IC) constraints lead to
and
We ignore (IC) for the moment and solve the relaxed problem. Substituting b   and b   with the right hand side of (14) and (15), respectively, we can rewrite the objective function of (P2) as follows: Recall that Π * = max{Π * 1  Π * 2 } where Π * 1 and Π * 2 are the optimal value of (P1') and (P1"), respectively. When   =   = , it is straightforward to solve (P1') and (P1"), resulting in
further, it follows from (16) that
By comparing (17) and (18), it follows from the definition of Γ(· ·) that Π * ≥ b Π * .
Taking the derivative of Π * − b Π * given in (17) and (18) Suppose   = +∞. Then  2 =  3 = 0, and thus Π * is equal to the optimal objective value of (P1") defined in the proof of Proposition 2. Because  *   0, it follows from the objective function of (P1") that Π * = −∞. Thus, as   is sufficiently large, Π *  b Π * . Therefore, there exist a threshold  ∈ (0 ∞) such that if   −    , Π * − b Π *  0. (iii) Suppose  = 0. Then  *  =  *  = 0, and thus Π * is equal to the optimal objective value of (P1') defined in the proof of Proposition 2. Further, the optimal solution to (P1') is the unconstrained optimum:  *  =  1 and  *  =  3 . Hence,
Recall from (16) 
which can be solved in two cases. 
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